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Nontechnical Summary 
This paper examines the fluctuations of the time-varying policy neutral interest rate for the Czech 
Republic in 2001:1-2006:09 within a simple Taylor-type monetary policy rules framework. 
Generally, these rules postulate that the central bank targets to set the nominal interest rate in line 
with the state of the economy (typically captured by inflation and output relative to their targeted 
values). To address the sensitivity of our results, the policy rule specifications differ according to 
whether we include real-time or ex-post revised data, employ backward or forward-looking 
monetary policy rules or vary the measure of the output gap.  
The novelty of our approach lies in estimation of the policy neutral rate by a time-varying 
parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim, 2006). Unlike the ‘conventional’ time-
varying parameter model, this approach is robust to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
which is indeed relevant when estimating the monetary policy rules. While endogeneity is almost 
always accounted for in the literature on time-invariant monetary policy rules, as it is estimated by 
the generalized method of moments (GMM), it is almost never addressed in studies on time-
varying policy rules.  
The results indicate that the policy neutral rate decreases gradually over the course of the sample 
period from around 5% in 2001 to about 2.5% in 2006, showing substantial interest rate 
convergence to levels comparable to the euro area. Over the longer term, this trend may be 
supported by a number of economic factors such as capital accumulation, decrease in the risk 
premium, real equilibrium exchange rate appreciation as well as successful disinflation of the 
Czech economy and well-anchored inflation expectations.  
One of our primary policy applications, besides measuring the policy neutral rate by a novel 
technique, is also to propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of 
the actual interest rate from the policy neutral rate. Our results suggest that this measure is quite 
useful in predicting future inflation developments, i.e. the monetary policy stance indicator affects 
the level as well as the change of the future inflation rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting regimes are increasingly popular around the world. For example, regarding 
Central and Eastern Europe, while the first two countries adopted explicit inflation targeting 
regime back in 1998, there were already seven countries conducting inflation targeting in 2006 
and others were contemplating doing so (International Monetary Fund, 2006).
1 A characteristic 
feature of inflation targeting is that central banks set the short-term nominal interest rate (path) so 
as to get inflation and output to their targeted levels. The level of interest rates that is associated 
with this objective is often labeled as the policy neutral rate.  
In this regard, Woodford (2003) notes that central banks should on average track the policy 
neutral rate to stabilize the economy. In a similar fashion, Taylor (1999) emphasizes that the 
measurement of the policy neutral rate is one of the key issues for countries targeting inflation. In 
this respect, it is of great importance for central banks to identify as precisely as possible the 
policy neutral rate. This is quite an intricate exercise, as the policy neutral rate is unobservable; 
however its mis-measurement is high-priced, as it may result in over- or undershooting the 
inflation target.  
In this light, it is quite striking that remarkably little evidence is available for Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) on the estimation of the policy neutral rate. While there are dozens 
of studies on equilibrium exchange rates in the new EU members, there is surprisingly very little 
evidence on equilibrium interest rates (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2006, seems to be the only exception, 
with evidence on Poland). This imbalance is rather paradoxical, as half the new EU members 
target inflation (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), for which the concept 
of the policy neutral rate is of primary importance for the conduct of monetary policy.
2 
Consequently, this paper tries to bridge this gap. 
This paper addresses the issue of policy neutral rate estimation in one of the new EU member 
states, the Czech Republic, based on various specifications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy 
rules. This former transition country provides an interesting case to evaluate the policy neutral 
interest rate, as one can expect a certain pattern in the path of nominal and real equilibrium 
interest rates over the longer term (note that the policy neutral rate is in fact the short-term 
nominal equilibrium interest rate; more on definitions below). 
Lipschitz et al. (2006) point out that at the outset of the transition the capital/labor ratios were 
much lower than those in Western Europe and therefore the marginal product of capital and for 
that reason the real equilibrium interest rate were rather high. Given the capital accumulation over 
the course of the transition, there should be a tendency for the real equilibrium interest rate to 
decrease. From an open economy perspective, the new EU members exhibited falling exchange 
rate risk premium during their transition process to a market economy (Beneš and N’Diaye, 
2004), which also puts downward pressure on real equilibrium interest rates (Archibald and 
Hunter, 2001). Analogously, it is a well-documented empirical regularity that these countries 
exhibit real equilibrium exchange rate appreciation (see Égert et al., 2006 for a comprehensive 
                                                           
1 The Czech Republic and Poland adopted inflation targeting in 1998, followed by Hungary in 2001, Romania 
and Slovakia in 2005 and Armenia and the Serbia in 2006 (note this is an updated list of Table 1 in IMF, 2006). 
Ukraine is likely to adopt inflation targeting in near future (IMF, 2006). 
2 See Coats et al. (2003) and Kotlan and Navratil (2003) on Czech monetary policy. 4   Roman Horváth   
 
survey of the sources of appreciation). A decrease in the foreign equilibrium interest rate, which is 
reported by several authors for the euro area (e.g. Wintr et al., 2005), may, especially in a small 
open economy, reduce the level of the domestic equilibrium interest rate as well. Additionally, the 
path of nominal equilibrium interest rates should reflect not only the decrease of real equilibrium 
rates, but also successful disinflation in transition countries (see Korhonen and Wachtel, 2006). 
All in all, the aforementioned arguments provide a rationale for modeling the policy neutral rate 
as time-varying. 
In this paper we provide first an estimation of monetary policy rules with a time-varying intercept 
to assess the fluctuations of the policy neutral interest rate over time. The novelty of our approach 
lies in estimation of the policy neutral rate by the time-varying parameter model with endogenous 
regressors (Kim, 2006).
3 Unlike the ‘conventional’ time-varying parameter model
4, this approach 
is robust to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, which is indeed relevant when estimating 
the monetary policy rules. While endogeneity is almost always accounted for in the literature on 
time-invariant monetary policy rules, as it is estimated by the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), it is almost never addressed in studies on time-varying policy rules. An additional feature 
of this paper is that we utilize ex-post as well as real-time based data (see e.g. Orphanides, 2001, 
on real-time data analysis within a monetary policy rules framework), specifically the real-time 
output gap and real-time inflation forecast of the Czech National Bank (CNB), to estimate the 
monetary policy rules.  
One of our primary policy applications, except for measuring the policy neutral rate by a novel 
technique, is also to propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of 
the actual interest rate from the estimated policy neutral rate. Anticipating our results, we find this 
measure of the monetary policy stance quite useful in predicting both the level and change of the 
future inflation rate.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes our 
data and empirical methodology. Section 4 gives the results of the estimation of time-varying 
estimates of the policy neutral rate as well as an analysis of the ability of the monetary policy 
stance to predict future inflation developments. Section 5 concludes. An appendix with additional 
results follows.  
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Methodological Background 
It has been acknowledged in monetary economics for a long time that there exists some 
unobservable real interest rate that equilibrates aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
(Woodford, 2003). When the actual real interest rate is equal to the unobservable one, price 
stability is achieved. This unobservable rate is often labeled as the natural rate of interest or 
equilibrium interest rate. Equivalently, it has been noted that the equilibrium interest rate is the 
                                                           
3 Note that in the working paper version of Kim (2006), this procedure is also labeled as the augmented Kalman 
filter. 
4 We label the time-varying parameter as conventional, when it does not account for endogeneity in the 
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real interest rate that prevails when prices are fully flexible in all markets (Neiss and Nelson, 
2003; Woodford, 2003).   
Consequently, the equilibrium interest rate or natural rate of interest is a fairly general concept 
and in principle it may be well associated with short-term, medium-term or long-term interest 
rates. In this context, it is worth pointing out that the determinants of the equilibrium interest rate 
are likely to differ according to time horizon (different frequency movements). In the long-term, 
the level of the equilibrium interest rate is influenced by supply-side structural characteristics of 
economy such as long-run growth potential, which in turn depends on technological progress, 
population growth and inter-temporal substitution of consumption (Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 
2005). In the medium-term, the equilibrium interest rate is associated with business cycle 
fluctuations. In the short-term, the equilibrium interest rate is linked mainly to demand factors 
related to monetary policy and its targeting horizon (Archibald and Hunter, 2001). Here monetary 
policy may systematically influence inflation expectations and in turn the level of the short-term 
nominal equilibrium rate.  
For the purposes of monetary policy conduct, it is vital to know which interest rate level the 
monetary authority should set in order to achieve price stability (i.e. neutral policy stance). As the 
primary monetary policy instrument is the level of the short-term interest rate, the equilibrium 
interest rate in this context is a rather short-term concept and is often labeled as the policy neutral 
rate (Coats et al., 2003; Lam and Tkacz, 2004; Beneš et al., 2005). The policy neutral rate thus 
represents the nominal equilibrium interest rate and is defined as the real equilibrium interest rate 
plus expected inflation (Coats et al., 2003). In other words, the policy neutral rate is linked to the 
short-term nominal interest rate, over which the central bank has substantial control, and thus the 
policy neutral rate may be understood as a rather narrower concept in comparison to equilibrium 
interest rate and natural rate of interest.
5  
Should interest rate policy of the monetary authority strictly follow the neutral rate when targeting 
inflation? Not necessarily. The first point is that obviously there is uncertainty in policy neutral 
rate measurement. Second, and more importantly, there are shocks to which it is sub-optimal for 
the authority to react. More specifically, central banks may wish deliberately not to react to the 
first-round effects of cost-push shocks, as this can be destabilizing to the economy in the short 
run. This may, however, alter the inflation expectations of economic agents, if some fraction of 
them are myopic, and as a result, induce a change in the policy neutral rate. In such case, the 
central bank’s interest rate policy may temporarily deviate from the policy neutral rate. 
2.2 Methods for Natural Rate of Interest Estimation 
Generally, there are several main methods for estimating the natural rate of interest (see e.g. 
Giammarioli and Valla, 2004, for a survey).
6 The simplest is to assume that the equilibrium is 
                                                           
5 For convenience, we use policy neutral rate, natural rate of interest and equilibrium interest rate in the 
following text interchangeably to a certain extent. However, when we want to emphasize the short-run concept 
of it, we always use the term policy neutral rate.  
6 Note that we do not present the exhaustive list of methods for equilibrium interest rate estimation, for example 
Brzoza-Brzezina (2006) proposes a structural vector autoregression model in this regard. In general, the role of 
the equilibrium interest rate for monetary policy conduct is discussed extensively by Taylor (1993), Woodford 
(2003) and Amato (2005).  
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captured reasonably well by some univariate trend such as an HP filter. Nevertheless, a number of 
papers document that the estimates based on these filters are often misleading (Clark and Kozicki, 
2005). In general, the limitations of the univariate methods have been pointed out by many 
authors (e.g. Canova, 1998).  
Another method for deriving equilibrium interest rates is based on the estimation of a simple 
monetary policy rule of the central bank (Taylor, 1993). The reaction function typically associates 
short-term interest rate with its lagged value, the difference between inflation (forecast) and its 
target, and the output gap. The intercept of the estimated reaction function can be interpreted as 
the nominal equilibrium interest rate (that is, the interest rate that would prevail when inflation 
and output are at their targeted values). This method has been applied to estimate the equilibrium 
interest rates by e.g. Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) and Orphanides (2001) for the United States and 
Germany, Adam et al. (2005) for the United Kingdom, and Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004, 2005) 
for the euro area. Nevertheless, the assumption of constant equilibrium interest rates is often 
found too restrictive over the longer term. Consequently, a number of studies model the 
equilibrium interest rate, or more generally the monetary policy rule as time-varying (see Plantier 
and Scrimgeour, 2002, Elkhoury, 2006, and Kim and Nelson, 2006). Typically, these studies find 
a rationale for modeling the rule as time-varying, given that the equilibrium interest rate 
sometimes fluctuates considerably over longer time horizons (as do other parameters in the policy 
rule). Generally, the monetary policy rules approach measures the behavior of the central bank 
and assumes that the central bank estimates equilibrium interest rates correctly. In case of 
systematic mis-measurement of equilibrium rates by the central bank, it is likely that the 
equilibrium rates retrieved from the estimation of the reaction function are mis-measured as well.  
Structural time series models represent another common method for measuring equilibrium 
interest rates. The primary contribution in this area is Laubach and Williams (2003), who 
formulate a simple empirical model containing an IS curve, a Phillips curve and an equation 
linking the equilibrium interest rate to trend growth, and model equilibrium interest rates and 
potential output as unobserved components. Their method has gained popularity recently and has 
been applied by Manrique and Marques (2004) for the U.S. and Germany, Mesonnier and Renne 
(2007) for the euro area, and Wintr, Guarda and Rouabah (2005) for the euro area
7 and 
Luxembourg as well. In principle, the joint estimation of equilibrium interest rates and the output 
gap is an advantage of this approach; however it also reduces the degrees of freedom, which may 
be an issue for transition countries with rather short time series.   
Equilibrium interest rates can also be estimated within stochastic dynamic general equilibrium 
models. The advantage of this type of literature is that it specifies the structure of the economy 
and thus in principle allows identification of a variety of shocks hitting the economy. On the other 
hand, Levin et al. (1999) find that more complex models seem to be less robust to model 
uncertainty (see also Giammarioli and Valla, 2004). Consequently, these model outcomes may be 
quite sensitive to model assumptions. The recent examples of this approach to estimating 
equilibrium interest rates include Giammarioli and Valla (2003), Neiss and Nelson (2003) and 
Smets and Wouters (2003).   
 
                                                           
7 See Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) on related estimates for the euro area using a somewhat different 
methodology.  The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   7 
 
The last major stream of literature estimates equilibrium interest rates from the yield curve and 
asset pricing models. Bomfim (2001) uses inflation linked bonds in order to eliminate the 
distortions from inflation expectations and retrieves equilibrium interest rates from the realized 
yields on U.S. Treasury inflation-indexed securities. In this regard, Giammarioli and Valla (2004) 
discuss equilibrium interest rate estimates in relation to consumption capital asset pricing models. 
Generally, this stream of literature hinges on the notion of liquid financial markets and thus this 
approach is viable mainly for countries with developed financial markets.   
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this part, we discuss the methodology and dataset we employ to evaluate the policy neutral rate 
fluctuations in the Czech Republic. Specifically, we estimate a variety of backward or forward 
looking monetary policy rules with a time-varying policy neutral rate.  
3.1 Monetary Policy Rules 
A starting point for a formal derivation of the monetary policy rule is the reasonable assumption 
that the central bank targets to set the nominal interest rate in line with the state of the economy 
(see Clarida et al., 1998, 2000), as postulated in Eq. (1):  




                         (1) 
where 
*
t r denotes the targeted interest rate, 
_
r is the policy neutral rate,  i t+ π stands for the central 
bank forecast of the yearly inflation rate i periods ahead, and 
*
i t+ π is the central bank’s inflation 
target.  t x  represents a measure of the output gap.  (.) E is the expectation operator and  t Ω  is the 
information set available at the time when interest rates are set. Hereinafter, we set i either equal 
to 12 months to reflect the CNB’s actual targeting horizon
8 or alternatively equal to 0, i.e. using 
the current inflation for the sensitivity analysis. Therefore, Eq. (1) links targeted nominal interest 
rates to a constant (i.e. the interest rate – policy neutral rate – that would prevail when expected 
inflation and output are at their targeted levels), the deviation of expected inflation from the target 
and the output gap.  
Nevertheless, Eq. (1) is often argued to be too restrictive, as it does not account for interest rate 
smoothing of central banks. Clarida et al. (1998) assume that the central bank adjusts the interest 
rate sluggishly to the targeted value. This is so for a number of reasons. For example, Goodfriend 
(1991) puts forward concerns over the stability of financial markets. Sack (1997) highlights 
uncertainty about the effects of interest rate changes on the economy.
9 Instead of an explicit 
                                                           
8 This is in line with the CNB main forecasting model – the Quarterly Prediction Model; see Coats et al., 2003. 
The actual targeting horizon is 12-18 months, but due to data limitations we prefer to work with 12 months. In 
general, see Batini and Nelson, 1999, for contributions on the optimal targeting horizon. Note also that the policy 
neutral rate is defined as the real rate plus the expected inflation in period t+k, where k is given by the maturity 
of the interbank rate (in our case k=3). k is thus different from the forecasting horizon i. As argued by Clarida et 
al. (2000), this is not very relevant in practice, as the short-term interbank interest rates at various maturities are 
strongly linked together. Indeed, the correlation of 3M PRIBOR and 12M PRIBOR – to reflect that i=12 – stands 
at 0.99 in our sample.  
9 Nevertheless, Rudebusch (2006) recently questioned the extent of monetary policy inertia and argued that the 
inertia is rather low. 8   Roman Horváth   
 
listing of various factors behind the interest rate smoothing, Clarida et al. (1998) assume for 
simplicity that the actual policy interest rate is a combination of its lagged value and the targeted 
policy rate as in Eq. (2).  
                                            ( ) t t t t r r r ν ρ ρ + − + = −
*
1 1                                                  (2),
10 
where  [] 1 , 0 ∈ ρ . In line with Clarida et al. (1998), substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (1) and 
eliminating unobserved forecast variables results in Eq. (3): 
                           () () t t t i t i t t r x r r ε ρ β π π α ρ + + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + − + − = − + + 1
*
_
1                     (3) 
The disturbance term  t ε  is a combination of forecast errors   
(i.e.,  [] }) { ( }) { ( ) 1 ( t t t t i t i t t x E x E Ω − + Ω − − − = + + β π π α ρ ε ) and is thus orthogonal to all 
information available at time t ( t Ω ). 
Next, in order to estimate the time-varying neutral policy rate we apply a structural time-varying 
coefficient model with endogenous regressors. Kim (2006) shows that the conventional time-
varying parameter model delivers inconsistent estimates when explanatory variables are correlated 
with the disturbance term, which is indeed relevant when estimating policy rules. It is interesting 
to note that the correlation of  i t+ π  and  t x  with  t ε in Eq. (3) is almost always taken into account 
in empirical work on time-invariant rules (as typically estimated by the GMM), while it is almost 
never considered in the literature on time-varying monetary policy rules (Kim and Nelson, 2006, 
seem to be the exception). Subsequently, Kim (2006) derives a consistent estimator of the time-
varying parameter model when regressors are endogenous. In line with Kim (2006), we estimate 
the following empirical model:  
        () () t t t i t i t t t r x r r ε ρ β π π α ρ + + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + − + − = − + + 1
*
_
1                    (4) 
                                  t t t r r ϑ + = −1
_ _
,  ( )
2 , 0 . . . ~ ϑ σ ϑ N d i i t                                   (5) 
                          t j t i t Z ϕ σ ξ π ϕ + = − +
'
,    ( ) 1 , 0 . . . ~ N d i i t ϕ                           (6) 
                         t j t t Z x ν σ ψ ν + = −
'
,   ( ) 1 , 0 . . . ~ N d i i t ν                               (7) 
The measurement equation (4) is a Taylor rule with the policy neutral rate,  t r
_
,  as outlined above. 
However, we relax here the assumption of a constant policy neutral rate and let it vary over time, 
t r
_
, as specified in the transition equation (5), assuming a random walk process without drift.
11 
Given the data limitations and the fact that our sample is characterized by a relatively stable 
                                                           
10 We estimated the monetary policy rules including higher lags of interest rates, but failed to find them 
significant.  
11 We also experimented with an AR(1) structure in Eq. (5), but it just marginally reduced the likelihood and the 
estimated AR parameter was very close to one, anyway.   The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   9 
 
institutional structure as well as actual conduct of monetary policy, we do not allow α , β  and ρ  
to be time-varying. The ‘first-stage’ Eqs. (6) and (7) lay out the relationship between the 
endogenous regressors ( i t+ π  and  t x ) and their instruments,  t Z . The list of instruments,  j t Z − , is as 
follows:  1 − t π ,  2 − t π ,  1 − t x ,  2 − t x ,  1 − t r  and 
+
t r (foreign interest rate – 1YEURIBOR). We assume that 
the parameters in Eqs. (6) and (7) are time-invariant. Next, the correlation between the 
standardized residuals  t ϕ  and  t ν and  t ε  is  ε ϕ κ ,  and  ε ν κ , , respectively (note that  ϕ σ  and  ν σ  are 
standard errors of  t ϕ  and  t ν , respectively). The consistent estimates of the coefficients in Eq. (4) 
are then obtained in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the equations (6) and (7) and save the 
standardized residuals  t ϕ  and  t ν . In the second step, we estimate Eq. (8) along with Eq. (5) using 
maximum likelihood via the Kalman filter. Note that (8) now includes bias correction terms, 
(standardized) residuals from Eqs. (6) and (7), to address the aforementioned endogeneity of the 
regressors. Consequently, the estimated parameters in Eq. (8) are consistent, as  t ι  is uncorrelated 
with the regressors. 
() () t t ε,t ,ε t ε,t ν,ε t t
*
i t i t t
_
t ι σ κ ν σ κ ρr βx π π α r ρ r + + + + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣







, ) 1 ( , 0 ~ t v t N ι ε ε ϕ ε σ κ κ − −                                                (8) 
Several authors (see for example Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004) raised the issue of including 
additional economic variables such as the (real) exchange rate or money growth in Eq. (3) to try to 
capture the state of the economy in a fuller manner. Nevertheless, this is typically done in an ad 
hoc manner. On the contrary, when the literature assumes that interest rates depend only on 
inflation and output, obviously it does not mean that other variables are neglected. For example, 
as Taylor (2001, p. 266) puts it for the exchange rate: “Although the policy rule ... may not appear 
to involve interest rate reaction to exchange rate, it implies such a reaction. What might appear to 
be a closed economy policy rule is actually just as much an open economy rule as if the exchange 
rate appeared directly.”  In other words, additional variables that do not enter Taylor rule directly 
may influence inflation and output and therefore the interest rate setting indirectly. It is also 
important to emphasize that CPI inflation targeting, as opposed to domestic inflation targeting, 
has an implicit concern for foreign shocks given the composition of the consumer basket 
(Svensson, 2000). Therefore, in our paper we do not introduce foreign disturbances explicitly in 
the monetary policy rule, but we will employ them as the instruments in our empirical 
specification.  
Additionally, in a book describing the current forecasting and policy analysis process in the CNB, 
Coats et al. (2003) report that no other variables than inflation and the output gap enter into the 
monetary policy rule in the CNB Quarterly Projection Model (QPM hereinafter). In particular, as 
regards exchange rate fluctuations the CNB has stated several times that it does not directly react 
to them. It has acknowledged that the exchange rate plays an important role for inflation 
developments in small open economies and that it might react indirectly to exchange rate 
fluctuations if they jeopardize inflation developments (Kotlán and Navrátil, 2003). Regarding 
money aggregates, one can expect that an inflation targeting central bank in general views them as 
only supplementary information about the degree of economic activity and/or inflationary 
pressures, and also does not directly react to them.  10   Roman Horváth   
 
Originally, the design of the Taylor rule lacked a forward-looking element characteristic of the 
modern monetary policy conduct. An additional way of assessing the sensitivity of our results is 
to estimate of both backward- and forward-looking Taylor-type rules. Therefore, we formulate the 
monetary policy rule in Eq. (3) in the case of backward-looking policy rule such that we set  0 = i , 
i.e. we use current inflation rate instead of its forecasted value (which is utilized for the forward-
looking policy rule). Another important point has been raised about the timeliness of information 
in monetary policy conduct (Orphanides, 2001). Output data are typically revised at a later stage, 
but monetary policy is conducted based on the information available at the time. Therefore, we 
collect real-time based CNB output gap estimates (note that inflation is not revised at a later stage 
by the Czech Statistical Office) and re-estimate the monetary policy rule with the real-time output 
gap. Analogously, we use one year ahead CNB’s real-time inflation forecast in estimating the 
monetary policy rule.  
There are further modeling issues stemming from the fact that the policy interest rate is not 
changed in a continuous fashion. For instance, the CNB Bank Board meets on a monthly basis to 
discuss the policy interest rate settings. Besides, the policy rate change itself is not continuous. 
Typically, if the rates are changed, the respective magnitude is 0.25 percentage points (or some 
multiple of 0.25), even if the change maximizing economic stability according to the model-based 
forecast might be of a (slightly) different magnitude. In consequence, the policy rate is not only 
discrete, but also censored. Given the inherent censoring of policy interest rates, the majority of 
authors, such as Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) and Adam et al. (2005), rely on using the 3-month 
interbank rate as an approximation of the censored policy rate.  
On the other hand, Choi (1999) and Carstensen (2006) put forward modeling censoring in the 
policy rate directly by employing for example a modified Tobit model and an ordered probit 
model, respectively. The advantage of this approach is that it models the interest rate setting more 
realistically and does not have to make a simplifying assumption by utilizing the short-term 
interbank rate. On the other hand, this stream of literature so far models only censoring in the 
policy rate, but it has been stressed that there is also censoring in the policy rate change (Podpiera, 
2006). In addition, censored models are known to be less efficient and the results based on them 
do not seem to stand up in sharp contrast to those using short-term interbank rates (for example, 
consider the extent of interest rate smoothing). An additional drawback of this approach in our 
case is that our main estimation technique is a time-varying parameter model with endogenous 
regressors (Kim, 2006) and to our knowledge this technique is simply not available with a 
censored dependent variable. Besides, the CNB’s QPM also uses the 3-month interbank rate 
instead of the 2-week policy rate as well. Having all the pros and cons of these two approaches – 
short-term interbank rate vs. policy interest rate – in mind, we opt to use the short-term interbank 
rate in the estimation of the monetary policy rules.  
3.2 Data 
Our sample contains monthly data over the period 2001:1-2006:09 on yearly CPI inflation 
( 12 − − = t t t p p π , where  t p  is the log of the price level at time t), yearly net inflation (price 






t p p 12 − − = π , where 
net
t p  is 
the log of the net price level at time t), the output gap ( t x ,the difference between actual and 
potential GDP growth, defined as below),  t r , the short-term interbank rate (3M PRIBOR), the real 
effective exchange rate, () t reer , and 
+
t r , the foreign interest rate (1YEURIBOR). We also use the The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   11 
 
real-time CNB internal forecasts of CPI ( )
f




12 + π , and the output gap. 
Three different estimates of the output gap are employed: a) the estimate using HP filter
12, b) the 
ex-post revised output gap from the CNB’s QPM as of their October 2006 forecast round and c) 
the real-time based output gap collected from the CNB’s QPM. The source of our data is the CNB 
public database system ARAD (except for inflation forecasts and the two aforementioned output 
gap measures – b) and c), which are not available publicly).  
All our variables are available on a monthly basis, except the output gap. Following Adam et al. 
(2005), we linearly interpolate quarterly estimates of the output gap to monthly values.
13 We use 
the mid-points of the CNB inflation target. The choice of the 2001-2006 period is motivated to 
have as long a sample period as possible, while not rejecting stationarity of all variables at the 5% 
significance level (using the KPSS test). More importantly, the real-time output gap and inflation 
forecast are not available before 2001. As a further robustness check, we also estimate the 
monetary policy rules with net inflation (based on price indexes excluding regulated goods from 
the consumer basket) instead of CPI inflation.
14 
4. Results 
4.1 Time-varying Equilibrium Interest Rates  
Generally, we find that the policy neutral rate decreases over time, as depicted in Chart 1. This is 
in line with our conjecture laid out in the introduction.  We report all specifications, from the 
backward-looking policy rule with the output gap estimated by the HP filter to the forward-
looking rule with the real-time output gap.  
The results in Chart 1 unambiguously indicate that the policy neutral rate gradually decreased 
from around 5% to values around 2% at the end of 2005 and subsequently slightly increased to 
around 2.5% over the course of 2006.
15 This confirms substantial interest rate convergence to 
levels comparable to the euro area countries. For example, Messonier and Renne (2007) estimate 
the euro area real equilibrium interest rate around 1% at the end of their sample (i.e. 2002) and 
Wintr et al. (2005) find it to have been just below 1% in 2004. If we add to these estimates 2% for 
                                                           
12 The standard smoothing parameter of 14440 has been used. Different smoothing parameters, such as the one 
suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), had very little impact on the resulting estimates of the policy neutral rate. 
The output gap derived from HP filter estimates of potential output differs considerably from those used by the 
CNB – see Chart B.2 in the Appendix. Note that the output gap from the CNB’s QPM is constructed using a 
multivariate Kalman filter. Generally, output gap estimates based on the HP filter can be viewed as less reliable, 
but we keep them in our empirical work, as this gap is replicable based on publicly available data, which is not 
the case with the two other output gap measures derived from the CNB’s QPM. Note also that the HP filter is 
known to suffer from end-point bias, making it cumbersome for real-time analysis.  
13 We also used a quadratic match procedure for interpolation. This yields only little differences for the resulting 
output gap estimates. We are aware that interpolation introduces information not available at the time in the case 
of the output gap.   
14 These results are available upon request. As net inflation is largely correlated with headline CPI inflation (a 
value of 0.93 in our sample), it is not surprising that the results are quite similar.  
15 The increase at the end of sample period is likely to reflect higher inflation expectations of economic agents. 
The CNB conducts regularly a survey on inflation expectations of financial markets, households and non-
financial firms (actual numbers are easily available from CNB website within their public database ARAD). 
Inflation expectations of financial markets for the 1 year horizon have risen from some 2.5% in mid 2005 to 3% 
over the course of 2006. Similar pattern is visible also for household’s and firm’s expectations.      12   Roman Horváth   
 
expected inflation – to reflect the European Central Bank definition of price stability, we receive 
an estimate of the policy neutral rate of about 3% for the euro area. The results actually suggest 
that the Czech policy neutral rate seems to be slightly below the euro area level. This should not 
come as a surprise, as actual short-term interest rates were also often below those in the euro area 
(except for several months in 2004, Czech rates appear to be below euro area rates from around 
mid-2002 onwards). 
Detailed parameter estimates of the monetary policy rules are presented in the Appendix – Table 
A.2. The degree of interest rate smoothing falls considerably when allowing for time-varying 
parameter specification. Compared to the case of the constant policy neutral assumption, which is 
estimated by the GMM
16, the value of the interest rate smoothing parameter falls from around 0.9 
to 0.4. Time-invariant rules thus appear to overestimate substantially the degree of interest rate 
smoothing. This complies with the results of Rudebusch (2006), who stresses that once one 
accounts for expectations about future monetary policy, the actual policy rate inertia is in fact 
quite low. The standard errors of the estimates are in some cases large, probably reflecting the 
smaller sample size. The coefficient on inflation is around 0.3 in the case of the backward-looking 
specifications (interestingly, it is significant only when we introduce bias correction terms,  t ϕ  and 
t ν ), and insignificant for the forward-looking specifications. The coefficient on the output gap is 
around 0.6 when it is significant; otherwise it is smaller for other specifications. 
Additionally, the results support the usefulness of applying the time-varying parameter model 
with endogenous regressors. The bias correction terms,  t ϕ  and  t ν , in Eq. (8), are typically 
significant and the log likelihood improves after their inclusion. Comparing the estimated policy 
neutral rate with those implied by the conventional time-varying parameter model, we find that 
the resulting difference between these two varies according to the specification of the policy rule 
as well as over time. While the median difference is only 0.05 p.p. in absolute terms, the 
maximum difference that the inclusion of bias correction terms amounts to is 1.8 p.p.  
Chart 3 in the Appendix presents a comparison of the policy neutral rate based on an identical 
specification of the policy rule, but estimated either by the time-varying parameter model with 
endogenous regressors or by the conventional time-varying parameter model. Denoting the policy 
neutral rate estimated by the former method,  er t r ,
_
, and the latter method,  c t r ,
_
, Chart A.3 reports 




= − c t er t r r  , the bias correction terms do not 
matter at all.
17 However, we can see from the results that although the two methods yield in 
general rather similar estimates of the policy neutral rate path, there are periods when the bias 
correction terms matter considerably, i.e. when the policy neutral rate estimates by the 
conventional time-varying parameter model do not even lie inside the confidence interval of the 
policy neutral rate estimated by the time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors, as 
shown in Chart A.3. 
 
                                                           
16 The GMM results are available upon request. 
17 Obviously, it might be the case that both bias correction terms are statistically significant, but they just “cancel 
out” their impact on the estimated policy neutral rate. The probability of “canceling out” for each month is 
virtually zero.  The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   13 
 
Figure 1: Policy Neutral Rate Estimates  
Time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors 
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Note: The policy neutral rate ±2 standard errors is reported. The measure of the output gap and 
inflation used for estimation of the policy neutral rate is reported below each chart. The time-
varying parameter model is labeled as conventional when it does not account for endogeneity 
of regressors.  14   Roman Horváth   
 
4.2 Monetary Policy Stance and Inflation Developments 
There is a discussion in the literature about to what extent monetary policy rules provide a useful 
framework to evaluate the monetary policy stance and its impact on subsequent inflation. This is 
typically done by comparing the actual interest rate setting with the one implied by the rule and 
inflation outcomes. For example, Taylor (1999, p. 340) labels the difference as the policy 
mistakes (i.e. the residual from the policy rule) and shows that they are well associated with high 
inflation or low capacity utilization with the U.S. data. On the other hand, Reynard (2007), 
analyzing the U.S. and Swiss data, questions the reliability of the so-called policy mistakes, as he 
observes rather weak link between so-called policy mistakes and inflation relative to the inflation 
target.  
Here we propose a rather different framework to evaluate the usefulness of policy rules. Instead of 
focusing on the residual from the policy rule, we analyze the deviation of actual interest rates 
from the policy neutral rate (“equilibrium rate”) and its impact on subsequent inflation. We leave 
examination of the link between policy mistakes and inflation outcomes for further research, as 
we do not concentrate in this paper on whether the estimated monetary policy rule provides an 
accurate description of CNB policy, but rather on the estimation and evolution of the policy 
neutral rate. Implicitly, by carrying out this estimation we also address the issue of the uncertainty 
surrounding with equilibrium interest rate measurement (see Laubach and Williams, 2003, or 
Herrmann, Orphanides and Siklos, 2005, on this uncertainty). In this regard, Amato (2005) 
emphasizes that the uncertainty in neutral rate estimates makes it difficult to use them as a reliable 
indicator of excess demand pressures, but the theories of neutral interest rates still remain a useful 
concept for the formulation of monetary policy.  
So, our simple test here is to examine whether our estimated policy neutral rate is helpful in 
predicting future inflation developments. If the policy neutral rate is too uncertain a measure, then 
it is more likely that it does not provide information for subsequent inflation. Our supposition is 
thus that when the actual interest rate is above the policy neutral rate, the future inflation rate is 
then likely to fall, as monetary policy can be considered restrictive, and vice versa. We label the 
difference between the actual interest rate and the policy neutral rate as the monetary policy 
stance hereinafter.  
The generic monetary policy stance is plotted in Chart 2.
18 As we also have confidence intervals 
for the policy neutral rate, it is possible to evaluate whether the stance was statistically different 
from zero. The results indicate that monetary policy during the sample period can be regarded as 
relatively easy, especially around the years 2002-2003. This should not come as a surprise, since 
inflation was well below the target and even got into negative numbers for several months in 2003 
and the output gap was negative, reaching its minimum in mid-2003 according to the CNB output 
gap estimates (see Chart A.1).  
                                                           
18 The monetary policy stance presented in Chart 2 is based on a monetary policy rule specification with an 
inflation forecast and an ex-post GDP gap. Different specifications play a rather minor role in the overall 
assessment of the monetary policy stance. In addition, it is interesting to note that the significance of monetary 
policy stance is not affected by whether we employed the backward or the forward looking policy rule.  The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   15 
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Note: Positive values refer to monetary policy tightening, while negative values point to policy easing. 
 
As there are transmission lags between a monetary policy action and its impact on the bank’s 
targeted variables, we assume that the current monetary policy stance affects inflation after 12 to 
24 months. This coincides well with the CNB monetary policy horizon, as the bank acknowledges 
that “…interest rate changes have their greatest impact on inflation some 12 to 18 months …” 
(CNB). It is also supported by the empirical findings of Borys-Morgese and Horvath (2007). 
Within their factor augmented VAR framework, they find that the peak response of inflation to 
interest rate shocks is around a year or so (note the maximum reaction of non-tradable inflation is 
found to be close to two years). Based on this evidence, it seems to be fruitful to analyze the 
horizon between about one and two years. Here we broadly follow the empirical specification by 
Moser et al. (2007), which is a variant of Stock and Watson (1999). While these two studies 
examine the role of factor models for inflation forecasting, we analyze the impact of the monetary 
policy stance instead. More specifically, we test the significance of monetary policy stance 
indicator, including it in an autoregressive-type model for the inflation process.  
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where for simplicity we set n=4.
19  
Using Eqs. (9) and (10), we investigate the information content of the monetary policy stance on 
the future level of inflation. We also re-specify the above equations to address the future change 
in the inflation rate as follows: 
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Note: Robust standard errors. 
***,
 ** and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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⎛ − + = υ φ φ φ
1
1 1 0  
i  0 φ   1 φ   2 φ   3 φ   4 φ   5 φ   Adj. R
2 
12 2.33
*** -0.94  0.03  0.04  0.07  -0.48  0.33 
13 1.95
** -2.49  -0.11  0.19  -0.06 -0.33  0.41 
14 1.67
* -3.59  -0.14  0.04  0.19 -0.36 0.46 
15  1.49 -4.26  -0.25  0.24 -0.07 -0.15 0.48 
16 0.66  -6.86
** -0.09  -0.07 -0.22 0.30  0.52 
17 0.02  -8.89
***  -0.25 -0.16 0.14 0.31 0.57 
18 -0.33  -9.98
*** -0.55
***  0.19 0.14 0.33 0.60 
19 -1.05  -12.12
*** -0.57
***  0.20 0.27 0.36 0.63 
20 -1.12  -12.27
*** -0.62
** 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.60 
21 -0.78  -11.09
**  -0.46  0.18 0.21 0.34 0.51 
22 -0.57  -10.31
** -0.42
** 0.25 -0.09 0.52 0.45 
23 -0.48  -9.86
** -0.26  -0.06 0.01 0.61
* 0.41 
24 -0.53  -9.89
** -0.40  0.12 -0.12 0.73
* 0.39 
Note: Robust standard errors. 
***,
 ** and 
*indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
i  0 φ   1 φ   Adj. R
2 
12 1.43
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⎛ − + = − υ φ φ 1 0  
i  0 φ   1 φ   Adj. R
2 
12 -3.04***  -15.39*** 0.53 
13 -3.29***  -16.55*** 0.57 
14 -3.48***  -17.47*** 0.59 
15 -3.54***  -17.77*** 0.59 
16 -3.58***  -18.01*** 0.60 
17 -3.60***  -18.09*** 0.60 
18 -3.56***  -17.93*** 0.59 
19 -3.60***  -18.05*** 0.60 
20 -3.54***  -17.81*** 0.60 
21 -3.42***  -17.24*** 0.60 
22 -3.28***  -16.62*** 0.58 
23 -3.10***  -15.88*** 0.56 
24 -2.89***  -15.11*** 0.53 
Note: Robust standard errors. 
***,
 ** and 
*indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
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⎛ − + = − υ φ φ φ
1
1 1 0  
i  0 φ   1 φ   2 φ   3 φ   4 φ   5 φ   Adj. R
2 
12 2.12***  -1.26  -1.11***  -0.08 0.53* -0.59  0.82 
13 1.62*  -3.18  -1.26***  0.05 0.43  -0.42  0.84 
14  1.41  -4.06  -1.28***  -0.11 0.67* -0.46  0.85 
15  1.44 -4.10  -1.41***  0.08 0.46 -0.33 0.86 
16  0.56  -6.82*  -1.24***  -0.23 0.33 0.13 0.86 
17 -0.08  -8.89**  -1.41***  -0.31  0.69**  0.14  0.89 
18 -0.33  -9.70***  -1.72***  0.05  0.68*  0.14  0.89 
19  -1.13  -12.05***  -1.74*** 0.07 0.80** 0.19  0.88 
20 -1.19  -12.20***  -1.79***  0.23  0.70*  0.20  0.87 
21 -0.86  -11.03***  -1.63***  0.02  0.77*  0.16  0.86 
22  -0.67  -10.31***  -1.61***  0.12 0.45 0.36 0.85 
23 -0.49  -9.55***  -1.45***  -0.13  0.42  0.48*  0.85 
24  -0.51  -9.49***  -1.57*** 0.02  0.32 0.59** 0.86 
Note: Robust standard errors. 
***,
 ** and 
*indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
The results from Eq. (9) are given in Table 1. Our definition of the monetary policy stance seems 
to be informative for future inflation, explaining typically about 1/3 of its variance. These results 
are largely confirmed when controlling for the lagged inflation terms, as suggested by the 
estimation of Eq. (10) presented in Table 2. The results suggest that when the actual interest rate 
is 10% above the policy neutral rate, inflation is likely to fall by about 1 p.p. at the monetary 
policy horizon. Similarly, the policy neutral rate seems to be a relatively good predictor of the 
future change of the inflation rate, as presented in Table 3. This result is largely robust to the 18   Roman Horváth   
 
inclusion of lagged inflation as well (see Table 4). All in all, the results support the usefulness of 
the policy neutral rate in understanding the future behavior of inflation.
20 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic. In order to do so, we estimate 
various specifications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy rules at monthly frequency from 
2001:1 to 2006:9. To address the sensitivity of results, the specifications differ based on whether 
we include real-time or ex-post revised data, employ backward or forward-looking monetary 
policy rules or vary the measure of the output gap.  
As we focus on the fluctuations of the policy neutral rate over time, we use a time-varying 
parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim, 2006). This approach is especially appealing 
for estimating monetary policy rules, as it addresses the endogeneity of inflation (forecast) and 
output gap. Indeed, the results support the usefulness of applying the time-varying parameter 
model with endogenous regressors. The bias correction terms, accounting for the endogeneity of 
the regressors, are typically significant. The log likelihood improves after their inclusion and the 
estimated path of the policy neutral rate is for certain periods considerably different from the 
estimates ignoring the endogeneity.  
The results indicate that the policy neutral rate decreases gradually over the course of the sample 
period from around 5% in 2001 to about 2.5% in 2006, showing substantial interest rate 
convergence to levels comparable to the euro area. Over the longer term, the decrease may be 
supported by a number of factors such as capital accumulation, decrease in the risk premium, real 
equilibrium exchange rate appreciation as well as successful disinflation of the Czech economy 
and well-anchored inflation expectations.  
One of our primary policy applications, besides measuring the policy neutral rate by a novel 
technique, is also to propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of 
the actual interest rate from the policy neutral rate. Our results indicate that this measure is quite 
useful in predicting future inflation developments, i.e. the monetary policy stance indicator affects 
the level as well as the change of the future inflation rate. In terms of future research, it would be 
interesting to see more evidence on other inflation targeting countries to uncover whether our 
proposed monetary policy stance measure remains a useful predictor of future inflation 
developments, as we find in the case of the Czech Republic. 
 
 
                                                           
20 We also tested the robustness of our results by including other macroeconomic variables in Eqs. (10) and (12) 
such as the real effective exchange rate, credit and monetary aggregates. The results remain largely unchanged 
and are available upon request.   The Time-Varying Policy Neutral Rate in Real Time   19 
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APPENDIX  

















Note: This chart presents current inflation, the short-term interbank interest rate (3M PRIBOR) and the 
CNB output gap as of the October 2006 forecast round. 
 







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gap - ex post Gap - real-time Gap - HP filter
 
Note: This chart presents the three measures of the output gap used in the paper: the output gap 
estimated by the CNB as of their October 2006 forecast round (Gap - ex post), the real-time 
based output gap estimated by the CNB (Gap - real-time) and the output gap calculated using 
the HP filter (Gap – HP filter) as the estimate of potential output. 
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Figure A.3: Importance of Bias Correction Terms in Estimating Policy Rules 
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Note: The difference between the policy neutral rates estimated from the time-varying parameter 
model with endogenous regressors,  er t r ,
_
, with its confidence intervals, and from the 
conventional time-varying parameter model,  c t r ,
_
. The measure of the output gap and inflation 
used for the estimation of the policy neutral rate is reported below each chart. Consequently, if 
the confidence intervals are different from zero, it means that  c t r ,
_
 does not lie within the 
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Table A.1: KPSS Test 
Series Test  statistic 
PRIBOR 3M  0.355* 
CPI Inflation  0.165 
CPI Inflation forecast (t+12)  0.163 
Net Inflation  0.147 
Output gap – HP filtered  0.106 
Output gap – Real-time   0.293 
Output gap – Ex-post   0.214 
M2 growth  0.168 
Real effective exchange rate  0.447* 
Note: The null hypothesis is that the series is level stationary. Critical values for the null hypothesis: 
10% - 0.347, 5% - 0.463, 1% - 0.739. Sample period: 2001:1-2006:09. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A.2: Monetary Policy Rules Estimation 
  () () t t t i t i t t t r x r r ε ρ β π π α ρ + + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + − + − = − + + 1
*
_
1                 
  t t t r r ϑ + = −1
_ _
,  ( )
2 , 0 . . . ~ ϑ σ ϑ N d i i t                                






, ) 1 ( , 0 ~ t v t N ι ε ε ϕ ε σ κ κ − −                                                
  Model 
Parameters  1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11  12 













  (0.02) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11) (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) (0.15) 
α   0.27
***  0.07  0.28
***  0.06  0.28
*** 0.07 -0.15 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16  -0.17 -0.14 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.12) (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) (0.09) 
β   0.21 0.11  -0.06  0.57
**  -0.06 -0.06  0.12  0.14  0.66
** 0.66
**  0.18 -0.02 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.27) (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.23) (0.19) 
ν,ε κ   -0.06
***    -0.07
***   
-
0.06
***  0.01   0.02    0.02  
  (0.01)  (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.01)   
,ε κϕ   -0.02
*    -0.02
*    -0.02
*   0.01  -0.01   -0.02
***   
  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)   (0.01)   
                    
AIC  -1.10 -1.00 -1.07  -1.00  -0.95  -0.94  -0.91 -0.94  -0.94  -0.96  -0.91 -0.88 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. 
***,
 ** and 
*indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10%, 
respectively. The models differ according to whether bias correction terms are included and the 
specification of  i t+ π and  t x .  i t+ π is either the CNB inflation forecast one year ahead 
(abbreviated as IF below) or the current inflation rate (IC).  t x is a measure of the output gap: 1. 
as estimated by HP filtering (HP), 2. CNB ex-post output gap measure based on multivariate 
Kalman filter procedure (EX), 3. CNB real-time output gap measure based on multivariate 
Kalman filter procedure (REAL). Models 1 and 2 = IC, HP; Models 3 and 4 = IC, EX; Models 
5 and 6 = IC, REAL; Models 7 and 8 = IF, HP; Models 9 and 10 = IF, EX and Models 11 and 
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